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ABSTRACT 
 
Indigenous Burmese accounts of warfare have been treated lightly in the 
secondary literature. Colonial historians pointed to the large numbers provided as 
fanciful, exaggerated, and unreliable. Later scholars, both indigenous and western, have 
followed suit. Chronicle accounts of Burmese warfare are judged solely by what 
“objective” data they can provide. Much of this valuable material thus remains untouched 
or unconsidered in the secondary literature. The argument of this article is that Burmese 
chronicle accounts of indigenous warfare can also be read in alternative ways. As this 
article attempts to demonstrate, lists of armies, their sizes, and their commanders, convey 
significant subjective data on indigenous views of precolonial Burmese history, culture, 
and society.  
                                                
1This article was originally presented as a paper in a panel organized by Barbara Andaya (University of 
Hawaii) for the Association for Asian Studies Annual Meeting, held in Washington, D.C., in April 2002. 
The author would like to thank Victor Lieberman (University of Michigan), who was the discussant for the 
Association for Asian Studies 2002 panel in which this paper was first presented and Atsuko Naono 
(University of Michigan), for their critiques of earlier drafts of this paper. Romanization for Burmese 
names and words used in this article follows John Okell’s “conventional transcription with accented tones” 
(Okell 1971: 31-45, 66-67). Adjustments have been made to accommodate different pronunciations by the 
Arakanese.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Early modern Burmese chronicles provide very rich descriptions of indigenous 
warfare as well as long lists of the quantities of men, cavalry, and elephants used in 
battles and campaigns. Historians of Burma have generally rejected such military 
statistics, since they frequently border on the fantastic, attributing to Burmese kings 
armies of almost one million men, sometimes more. Writing in the 1920s, G. E. Harvey 
rejected as simple hyperbole the figures in the chronicles for the armies of later kings. He 
suggested that the numbers of Burmese rank-and-file recorded by the chronicles were as 
much as ten times greater than the actual numbers of men involved in Burmese 
campaigns (Harvey 1967: 333-5). This view, however, represented more than a 
“colonial” attitude towards indigenous historical traditions; the erudite Paul J. Bennett 
also summarily dismissed one chronicle’s claim of Pagan-era (eleventh to thirteenth 
centuries) armies numbering up to 7.6 million men (Bennett 1971: 33). Certainly, while 
historians of Burma have long been aware that symbolic number schemes are at work in 
anything from the measurement of temple walls to the number of queens in the court 
(Heine-Geldern 1942), they have been reluctant to view military statistics in the same 
way. The prevailing literature continues to accept or, more commonly, to reject early 
modern military statistics found in the Burmese chronicles. Although there has been in 
recent years a reconsideration of the prevailing interpretations of information found in 
Burmese chronicles in general (Aung-Thwin 1998; Charney 2000; Charney 2002), no one 
has challenged prevailing interpretations of what military statistics in the chronicles 
actually represent.  
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In this article, I will challenge the prevailing approach to the military statistics 
provided in early modern Burmese texts. In doing so, I do not seek to demonstrate the 
accuracy or inaccuracy of the statistics on warfare they offer. Instead, I will look at how 
early modern Burmese literati wrote about warfare and attempt to explain why they used 
they seemingly exaggerated the numbers they provide. My argument is that the military 
statistics provided by the chronicles are not just numbers. Rather, these lists were a kind 
of a literary device intended to convey important messages about the society and politics 
of their own time. At a more general level, I hope to demonstrate that even though we 
cannot depend upon the lists of warriors found in the chronicles as objective statistics for 
early modern Burmese warfare, we can still draw out from them valuable, historically 
relevant, information. 
This article will examine the underlying reasons for the inclusion of numerical 
lists in early modern Burmese accounts of indigenous warfare. I will first look at the 
authors of these texts, the early modern Burmese literati, and their personal experience 
with indigenous warfare. I will then turn to several different sixteenth century historical 
events covered in the indigenous texts. Finally, I will discuss some of the drawbacks of 
attempting to use contemporaneous European accounts to verify or challenge the 
indigenous sources.  
 
LITERATURE, LITERATI, AND BURMESE WARFARE 
  
Burma’s historical records consist of a wide range of different kinds of materials 
and made use of statistics in different ways and with different purposes. In terms of the 
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use of numbers in the text, early modern Burma’s historical records can be split into two 
main groups. First, some kinds of sources were specifically intended to be taken at face 
value as hard and objective data on a range of items, such as local economy, township 
boundaries, population levels, rates of taxation, and other matters, in which precise 
numerical data was necessary for the functioning of the early modern Burmese state. 
These kinds of materials include inscriptions, sit-tàn (local administrative report), ameín-
daw (royal order), thekkarit (record of commercial transactions), and sadan (treatise). 
The second category includes ayeì-daw-bon (a kind of historical account usually focused 
on the rise to power of one king or dynasty), maw-gùn (commemorative poem), eì-gyìn (a 
genealogical poem), ya-zawin (chronicle), and thamaing (traditionally, a more focused 
history, usually concerning a specific individual, place, or pagoda) (Hla Pe 1985: 36-44). 
These kinds of texts were not necessarily intended to be read for the primary purpose of 
obtaining data. The purpose of these kinds of texts was to provide more subtle 
information in the context of an overall moral scheme. When statistical data was found, it 
would be viewed within the overall context of the work, rather than “mined” from the 
narrative. This article focuses upon works of the second category, whose primary 
purpose, again, suggests a different agenda whose focus was not the provision of 
statistics. 
 We can lay aside any assertion that early modern Burmese literati were unfamiliar 
with actual warfare and thus wrote about warfare from an uninformed perspective. 
Characterizations of the early modern secular Burmese literati as merely grander versions 
of court scribes or as leisurely scholars do not adequately describe this highly diverse 
group of learned men. While the specialized groups of Buddhist monks and court 
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Brahmins may indeed have kept their distance from the battlefield, many early modern 
Burmese literati had a thorough knowledge of the warfare of their time, largely gained 
through personal experience. Our knowledge of early modern Burmese warfare is 
generally derived from texts produced by these elite, literate men.  
Early modern Burmese elites lived almost simultaneously in several worlds. 
Certainly, they participated in peaceful literate elite culture. We know that Burmese 
males at least in the royal capitals would be sent to monastic and other schools to learn 
not simply to read and write and the major principles of Buddhism, but also to familiarize 
themselves with secular as well as religious literature (Manrique 1946: 1.194). The social 
expectation that elites should be literate is reflected in the ridicule that appears in some 
early modern Burmese texts of nobles who showed disinterest in reading. As we are told 
by one chronicle account: “Daka Rat Pi never looked at a book, took no heed of good 
practice, but only sported . . . He was like a deaf and dumb person, never looking at a 
book . . .” (SRDSR 1923: 58).   
Another world was the military campaign. The sons of elite families were also 
expected to participate in seemingly endless military campaigns as commanders and to 
demonstrate their personal prowess and loyalty on the battlefield. From both indigenous 
and European accounts we have strong and convincing evidence of the personal 
participation of elite men in early modern battles (i.e. De Brito 1607: 237-241). It seems 
fairly safe to assume that when those who survived returned home, they brought with 
them a new or strengthened knowledge of warfare obtained “in the field” and shared their 
experiences with other members of the court. 
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Thus, many and perhaps most, of the early modern Burmese literati would not 
have been ignorant of the actual nature of the warfare they described in their chronicles. 
Banyà-dalá, for example, was a member of the literati who composed the Razadhirat 
Ayeì-daw-bon in the sixteenth century.  H. L. Shorto believed that Banyà-dalá was at 
least one of the contributors to the Nidana Ramadhipati-katha, another sixteenth-century 
text (Tin Ohn 1962: 86; Lieberman 1984: 297). Banyà-dalá was also an official in the 
court of Bayín-naung (r. 1551-1581) and had served as a general under Bayín-naung in 
the 1564 campaign against Ayudhya, as well as numerous smaller campaigns. Such men 
would have had much personal knowledge of royal military campaigns, the actual 
numbers of men who fought in battles, and the strategies or tactics applied in battle. 
These personal life experiences informed court and other elite literature. This helps to 
explain the intimate knowledge of warfare and things military by numerous court 
ministers and writers throughout the early modern period, as we find, for example, in Zei-
yá-thin-hkaya’s 1783 Shwei-bon-ní-dàn and other texts. 
Being personally aware of the limited numbers of men used in military 
campaigns, such men would have known when a chronicle account was likely 
exaggerated and when it was not. Their strategic use of statistics in chronicle accounts, as 
I will discuss below, thus may reflect a different agenda from the simple provision of 
accurate lists of the numbers of men in Burmese campaigns. I will now turn to a few 
examples of how these men wrote about early modern Burmese military campaigns, and 
the numerical data they provide. 
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THE ARAKANESE CAMPAIGN AGAINST LOWER BURMA, 1598/99  
 
The first example is the western Burmese campaign against Pegu in 1598/99. 
During this campaign, Arakanese armies joined with Taung-ngu forces, surrounded Pegu, 
the royal capital of the great First Taung-ngu Dynasty (1486-1599), and then brought 
down the last ruler of that dynasty (for a detailed examination of this campaign, see 
Charney 1994). Most Arakanese chronicles include verbatim the information provided in 
a circa 1608 royal memorial on the campaign composed by Maha-zei-yá-theinka, who 
had earlier held the title of Banyà-wuntha (Maha-zei-yá-theinka 1608, 25b). I have 
already discussed this memorial in detail elsewhere (Charney 2002). Maha-zei-yá-theinka 
was the go-ran-grì, one of the four chief royal ministers in the Arakanese court, as well 
as the nephew of the previous go-ran-grì, Damá-thawka (RMAS 1775: 40b; Maha-zei-
yá-theinka 1608: 25b; Nga Mi 1840: 170b, 180b), when he composed this memorial. 
Certainly Damá-thawka and probably Maha-zei-yá-theinka had personally participated in 
this campaign and were thus first-hand observers (Maha-zei-yá-theinka 1608: 16b). 
In his memorial, Maha-zei-yá-theinka includes a list enumerating the western 
Burmese forces sent against Pegu in 1598/99. These forces comprised:  
 
(A)100, 000 men under the command of the Ko-ran-grì Damá-thawka, including 
20,000 Let-wè-thìn royal bodyguards under the command of Saw-nu, the eater 
of Kaladan and Rei-baun-nain, eater of Mindon 
20,000 Let-ya-thìn royal bodyguards under the command of Kamani, eater of 
Ta-shwei and the eater of Myó-kyaung (name not given) 
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10,000 Kaman Lei-kain warriors under the command of Ran-myó-baung, the 
eater of Taung-kout 
10,000 Tagaing spearmen under the command of Don-nyo, the eater of Than-
taung 
10,000 Ka-swei-kaung shield warriors, under the command of Durin-thu, eater 
of An 
30,000 Sak warriors under the command of the Sak king, Kaung-hlá-pru 
 
(B) 50,000 Bengali warriors and 300 boats under the command the Hsin-kei-krì, 
Manuha 
 
(C) 100,000 men under the command of the king, Mìn-ra-za-grì [consisting of]: 
 
  30,000 Let-wè-thìn royal bodyguards  
  30,000 Let-ya-thìn royal bodyguards 
  10,000 black shield warriors 
  10,000 Sak warriors 
  20,000 Hti-laung-ka cannon, musket, and round shield warriors 
 
(D) 50,000 men under the ein-sheí-mìn, Mìn-kamaung, and Ukka-byan, the eater of 
Sadan, including 
  30,000 Kanran and Balei warriors 
  20,000 Bengali Hti-laung-ka cannon, musket, and round shield  
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warriors (Maha-zei-yá-theinka 1608: 16b). 
  
This list is also provided in many later historical texts (Kawisara 1839: 58b-59a; Sandá-
mala-linkaya 1932: 2.145). 
Taken as figures for the actual number of men involved in this campaign, this list 
could easily be discounted as exaggeration on a grand scale. The numbers provided 
amount to 300,000 men, all from a kingdom whose population at the time likely was 
likely not more than 170,000 people (even in the mid-nineteenth century, western 
Burma’s population only amounted to about 260,000 people (Charney 1999: 334-336). 
The fact that this gross exaggeration was made by one so close to the campaign, 
in terms of both time and participation, immediately tells us several things. First, these 
large figures were contemporary or near-contemporary figures and were not the result of 
later embellishment. Second, these figures were provided by one of the key participants 
in the events covered and the nephew of one of the most important commanders in the 
campaign, who had also held the same court ministership during this campaign. Third, 
Maha-zei-yá-theinka composed his memorial in the royal court while the king who 
sponsored this campaign, Mìn-ra-za-grì (r. 1593-1612), was still on the throne, so the 
information had to have the king’s at least tacit approval. 
The timing of the composition is especially important, because four major 
developments had occurred between the end of the campaign in 1599 and the 
composition of the 1608 memorial: Mìn-ra-za-grì, after several years of disastrous 
warfare, lost control of Lower Burma to Philip de Brito after 1603 (Charney 1998b; 
Charney 1999: 107-108; Bocarro 1876: 1.131-148). These wars had been costly to the 
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Mrauk-U court in terms of men and arms. Next, in a 1607 naval battle with De Brito, 
large numbers of important members of the Mrauk-U nobility and some of its chief vassal 
rulers were lost (De Brito 1607: 237-241; Guerreiro 1930: 3.80). Mìn-ra-za-grì also 
alienated important segments of the western Burmese sangha when he blamed the sangha 
for his failures and put thirty elder monks to death (Guerreiro 1930: 2.319; Charney 
1999: 111). Finally, a rebellion by the heir apparent, Mìn-kamaung, had almost unseated 
Mìn-ra-za-grì as king (Maha-zei-yá-theinka 1608: 22a-b; Charney 1998b: 195-6). In 
short, at the time the 1608 memorial was composed, Mìn-ra-za-grì’s kingdom was 
unraveling and the elite families upon whom he depended for his security on the throne 
were in disorder. We also know that by 1608, Mìn-ra-za-grì was taking steps to prevent 
the increasing likelihood of his downfall and he did in the long run resurrect stability and 
a return to the processes of political centralization and territorial aggrandizement that had 
been underway before (Charney 1993; 1998b). 
 Considering all of this, I suggest that the listing of figures for the 1598/99 
campaign tells us several things. First, it is a kind of social and political map, indicating 
the relative importance of particular elite families, in the Mrauk-U court, thus reaffirming 
a social order that had worked well for Mìn-ra-za-grì in the past but that was now in very 
real danger of breaking down. Second, it treats Mìn-kamaung, the heir apparent, with 
special care. Although Mìn-kamaung had rebelled, Mìn-ra-za-grì forgave him as he was 
his only surviving son by a chief queen and otherwise most promising heir. But this 
rebellion is included, almost out of place, in Maha-zei-yá-theinka’s memorial. Possibly, 
Maha-zei-yá-theinka was making a point about Mìn-kamaung. If we look at the 
enumerated data provided by Maha-zei-yá-theinka for the campaign, it is clear that the 
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distribution of forces relegates Mìn-kamaung to a position equal to that of a lower-
ranking minister. 
More importantly, Mìn-kamaung is placed in a position beneath that of Damá-
thawka, who is presented as being on par with that of the king. This could be for several 
reasons. I think two are likely and another is possible. First, it reinforces the important 
place in the court of a family, the family of the author, who had proved to be Mìn-ra-za-
grì’s chief prop among the nobility. As the eldest brother of Maha-zei-yá-theinka’s father, 
Maha-Banyà-kyaw (Maha-zei-yá-theinka 1608: 25b; RMAS 1775: 40a-40b), Damá–
thawka was most likely the head of Maha-zei-yá-theinka’s clan. As both Maha-Banyà-
kyaw and Damá–thawka had died in the years since the campaign against Pegu, Maha-
zei-yá-theinka was heir to their glory, as well as to Damá–thawka’s status as the 
kingdom’s go-ran-grì. Thus, when Maha-zei-yá-theinka promoted Damá–thawka in his 
memorial, he was also, in a sense, promoting himself.  
Second, it is a preemptive downgrading of Mìn-kamaung in the expectation of 
Mìn-kamaung’s possible removal as heir-apparent. Third, given that there were no other 
royal sons to claim the throne, Maha-zei-yá-theinka was reinforcing the prowess of his 
own line and downgrading the person of Mìn-kamaung in order to make a possible bid 
for the throne after Mìn-ra-za-grì died. The numbers, then, play a useful role in 
measuring not the actual numbers of men involved, but rather in reinforcing the social 
and political order of the court constructed by an individual who stood to benefit from its 
realization, as did the king in whose court this text was composed. 
 
THE CAMPAIGNS AGAINST AYUDHYA 
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 A similar use of military statistics can be found in the treatment of Tabin-shwei-
htì’s (r. 1531-1550) and Bayín-naung’s (r. 1551-1581) sixteenth-century campaigns 
against Ayudhya in two central Burmese histories, the Hman-nàn maha-ya-zawin-daw-
gyì and Ù Kalà’s Maha-ya-zawin-gyì (great chronicle), both of which use the same 
figures for these campaigns (the best study to date of Tabin-shwei-htì’s and Bayín-
naung’s reigns, as well as the First and Restored Taung-ngu Dynasties generally remains 
Lieberman 1984). The Hman-nàn maha-ya-zawin-daw-gyì‘s sources are not difficult to 
find. The compilers – learned ministers, Buddhist monks, and court Brahmins – met 
together over the course of 1829-1831 on the orders of King Ba-gyì-daw (r. 1819-1837) 
and produced what amounts to an upgrading of the old “Great Chronicle” of Ù Kalà 
(circa 1730). In some places they introduced new material into the pre-1711 coverage of 
Burmese history, but generally they incorporated nearly verbatim Ù Kalà’s text for this 
period (Hla Pe 1985: 39). The inflated figures, then, can be drawn back to 1730. Trying 
to move further back than 1730 is more difficult, though not impossible: the royal library, 
and many of Ù Kalà’s sources, were lost to fire during the siege of Ava in the early 
months of 1752 (Lieberman 1984: 294). Other materials have survived, however, 
especially Mon histories that do shed considerable light on contemporary statistics for the 
reigns of Tabin-shwei-htì and Bayín-naung. 
According to the Hman-nàn maha-ya-zawin-daw-gyì and Ù Kalà, Tabin-shwei-htì 
invaded Ayudhya in 1548 with 100,000 men: 
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 Marching in the middle: One army under the King of Prome, Thado- damá-ya-za, 
one army under Thiri-zei-yá-kyaw-din, one army under Thamein Bra-tha-maik, one 
army under Thamein Maw-kun, one army under Thamein Baran [consisting 
altogether of] 100 elephants, 1000 cavalry, 50,000 Men. 
 
 Ascending on left: one army under Bayín-naung-kyaw-din-naw-ra-ta, one army 
under Nan-dá-yaw-da, one army under Sawlu-ku-nein, one army under Thamein 
Yei-thìn-gyan, one army under Thamein Than-kyei [consisting of]: 100 elephants, 
1000 cavalry, 50,000 Men (HNY 1883: 2.284).  
 
This gives Tabin-shwei-htì’s army exactly 200 elephants, 2000 cavalry, and 100,000 
men.  
Chronicles and other texts that predate Ù Kalà’s chronicle do exist. One of these is 
the sixteenth-century Mon text, the Nidana Ramadhipati-katha, which was composed at 
least in part by Banyà-dalá, one of Bayín-naung’s chief commanders (Lieberman 1984: 
297).  The date and location are important not so much because they verify the 100,000 
figure, but rather because they demonstrate that these figures were not the result of post-
sixteenth century exaggeration. They were certainly current in the First Taung-ngu court 
in the early 1580s. As the Nidana Ramadhipati-katha explains, in 1547, Tabin-shwei-htì 
“took the field against Ayuthaya with more than 100, 000 Shans, Burmans, and Mons and 
numerous elephants and cavalry” (RDK, n.d.: 47). The importance of this relatively 
unexaggerated figure emerges when we compare it to accounts of Bayín-naung’s 
campaign against Ayudhya in 1564.  
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The importance of this relatively unexaggerated figure emerges when we compare it 
to accounts of Bayín-naung’s campaign against Ayudhya in 1564. While Tabin-shwei-htì 
had a meager 100,000 men for his campaign, the Hman-nàn maha-ya-zawin-daw-gyì 
reports that Bayín-naung had over eight times as many (HNY 1883: 2.424-427): The 
following is a translation of the Hman-nàn maha-ya-zawin-daw-gyì‘s list of forces taken 
by Bayín-naung against Ayudhya in 1564. 
 
(A) As for the men the king appointed to march against Chiengmai: Mogaung 
saw-bwà, one army; Mohnyin saw-bwà one army, Möng Mit saw-bwà one 
army, Ounbaung saw-bwà one army, Thibaw saw-bwà one army, Nyaung-
shwei saw-bwà one army, Möng Nai saw-bwà one army, Thiha-ba-dei one 
army, Mìn-kyaw-din one army, the royal son-in-law, the bayin of Inwa, 
Thado-mìn-zaw one army 
 
These ten armies included altogether 300 war elephants, 6,000 cavalry, and 
120,000 warriors placed by the king under the overall command of Thado-
mìn-zaw and ordered to march against Chiengmai by the Monei route. 
 
(B) As for the armies that marched from the royal feet: Let-wè-yè-dain horse 
army, Ya-za-da-man horse army, Duyin-ya-za horse army, Nan-dá-thein-si 
horse army, Duyin-bala horse army 
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In the elephant army: Nei-myò-kyaw-din one army, Thamein Yè-thìn-yan one 
army; Nan-dá-thìn-gyan one army, Banyà-gyan-daw one army, Tha-yè-si-thu 
one army, Banyà-dalá one army, Thi-rí-zei-yá-kyaw-din one army, Banyà-sek 
one army, Si-thu-kyaw-din one army, the maha-uppa-ra-za (the prince) one 
army. 
 
With the five horse armies, amounting to fifteen armies altogether, there were 
500 war elephants, 6,000 cavalry, and 120,000 warriors. They had to march 
by the right-side route. 
 
(C) Let-ya-yaw-da horse army, Bayá-ya-za horse army, Duyin-thein-di horse 
army, Duyin-banyà horse army, Sik-duyin-gathu horse army. In the elephant 
army: Nan-dá-kyaw-din one army, Thamein Than-kyei one army, Thin-khaya 
one army, Thamein Yo-garat one army, Mìn-maha one army, E-mon-taya one 
army, Nan-dá-kyaw-thu one army, Thamein Than-leik one army, Baya-kyaw-
din one army, the royal younger brother, the bayin of Prome, Thado-damá-ya-
za, one army. 
 
With the five horse armies, amounting to fifteen armies altogether, there were 
a total of 300 war elephants, 6,000 cavalry, and 120,000 warriors. They had to 
march in the middle. 
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(D) Let-ya-ye-dain horse army, Let-wè-baya horse army, Zei-yá-daman horse 
army, Let-ya-duyin horse army, Duyin-yaw-da horse army. In the elephant 
army: Zei-yá-kyaw-din one army, Thamein Zeit-pon one army, Bayá-kyaw-
thu one army, Thamein Ngo-kun one army, Ya-za-thìn-gyan one army, 
Banyà-bat one army, Thek-shei-kyaw-din one army, Banyà-law one army, 
Nan-dá-yaw-da one army, the royal younger brother, the bayin of Taung-ngu, 
Mìn-kaung one army. 
 
With the five horse armies, amounting to fifteen armies altogether, there were 
a total of 300 war elephants, 6,000 cavalry, and 120,000 warriors. They had to 
march to the left side. 
 
(E) Duyin-thein-si horse army, Duyin-deiwa horse army, Deiwa-thuri horse 
army, Thura-gama horse army, Kaza-thiri horse army. In the elephant army: 
the son-in-law of the king of Ayudhya, Ei-ya-damá-ya-za one army, Zeiya-
thìn-gyan one army, Ei-ya-thuwana-lawka one army, Theik-daw-shei one 
army, Ei-ya-thauk-kadei one army, Thiri-zei-yá-naw-ya-ta one army, Ei-ya-
beit-si one army, Satu-gamani one army, Mìn-yè-thìn-hkaya one army, the 
royal nephew Thayawaddy-Mìn-yè-kyaw-din one army. 
 
With the five horse armies, amounting to fifteen armies altogether, there were 
a total of 300 war elephants, 60,000 cavalry [appears to be an error for 6,000], 
and 120,000 warriors. They had to march against Chiengmai from Eindi-giri. 
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(F) Deiwa-thara horse army, Zei-yá-duyin horse army, Deiwa-baya horse 
army, Duyin-kyaw horse army, Deiwa-thiri horse army. In the elephant army: 
Let-ya-yan-da-thu one army, Thamein Lagu-nein one army, Bayá-gamani one 
army, Thamein Zaw-gayat one army, Nei-myò-thìn-hkaya one army, Mìn-yè-
lu-lin one army, Nan-dá-meit-kyaw-din one army, Thamein È-ba-yè one 
army, Zei-yá-gamani one army. 
 
With the five horse armies, amounting to fifteen armies altogether, there were 
a total of 700 war elephants, 5,000 cavalry, and 150,000 warriors. 
 
The men on the four sides of the royal entry point in the royal army, were 
exclusively ordered to carry golden shields. 
 
(G) In front of the king, Bayá-nan-dá-thu was appointed as sit-kè and Nan-dá-
kyaw-din as commander with 100 war elephants, 1,000 cavalry, and 10,000 
soldiers. On the right side of the king, the king appointed Zei-yá-yan-da-meit 
as sit-kè and Thek-shei-kyaw-din as commander with 100 war elephants, 
1,000 cavalry, and 10,000 soldiers. On the left side of the king, the king 
appointed Bayá-yan-da-meit as sit-kè and U-dein-kyaw-din as commander 
with 100 war elephants, 1,000 cavalry, and 10,000 soldiers. In back of the 
king, Nan-dá-thiha was appointed as sit-kè and Let-wè-zei-yá-thìn-gyan as 
commander with 100 war elephants, 1,000 cavalry, and 10, 000 soldiers.  
 18 
 
(H) After the 1,000 Indians had been ordered to tie up their turbans [or sashes 
around their waists], they were ordered to carry their muskets and follow in 
front and back of the royal elephant, one both sides of the [elephant’s 
armpits]. The 400 Portuguese were ordered to take the cannon [mortars] and 
follow on all sides [of the king’s elephant]. 
 
(I) Banyà-bayan one army, Taya-pya one army, Tanaw one army, Bayá-thìn-
gyan one army, [one army is missing here in the text]. These five armies, 
together with their complement, were appointed by the king to guard the royal 
city of Hanthawaddy . . . In 1564, the king marched from 
Hanthawaddy…(HNY 1883: 2.424-427) 
 
Clearly there is a good deal of stylization in the account with an attempt at exact 
symmetry, but the attention here is on the statistics themselves. These figures and 
divisions are clearly derived, and repeated nearly verbatim, from Ù Kalà, although the 
Hman-nàn maha-ya-zawin-daw-gyì adds a few additional commanders to the former’s 
account (Kalà 1932: 2.349-351). 
Bayín-naung’s forces numbered at least eight times those suggested for the size of 
Tabin-shwei-htì’s armies less than twenty years earlier. As was the case with the figures 
for the western Burmese campaign against Pegu, similarly exaggerated numbers can be 
traced back to Bayín-naung’s reign. As the Nidana Ramadhipati-katha explains: in 1663, 
“the King gave the word to march on Ayuthaya. His forces at this time, not including the 
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Chiengmai rebels, amounted to more than 900,000 men, with 500 tuskers and 4,000 
horses . . .” (RDK n.d.: 105) The exaggeration then was not created by later writers. 
Rather, these figures must have circulated among Burmese literati in Bayín-naung’s court 
and were recorded by one of them, Banyà-dalá, in his contemporary text.  
It is doubtful if such great differences between the figures provided for Tabin-
shwei-htì’s campaign against Ayudhya and that of Bayín-naung can be explained by 
Bayín-naung’s admittedly greater command of manpower in sixteenth century Burma 
alone. Even with a stronger degree of political centralization and allegiance than that 
enjoyed by Tabin-shwei-htì, it does not seem likely that Bayín-naung could have 
increased First Taung-ngu manpower reserves eight or nine-fold in less than two 
decades. Furthermore, in terms of logistics alone, as Harvey points out, it would have 
been impossible to muster and move an army even several times smaller than that 
suggested for Bayín-naung’s force (Harvey 1967: 335). A better explanation for the 
disparity in the texts between Tabin-shwei-htì’s and Bayín-naung’s armies is needed. 
There are several alternative explanations. One explanation is that the author (s), 
as an insider(s) in the court of Bayín-naung, would have had reason to embellish to some 
degree Bayín-naung’s eminence. A better answer, however, is found by examining why 
Tabin-shwei-htì would be undermined through the statistics for his armies by comparison 
with those of Bayín-naung. Tabin-shwei-htì, unlike Bayín-naung, was not popular among 
important groups in the First Taung-ngu court. Both Burman and Mon literati denigrated 
him in their historical texts by their insertion into these texts of Tabin-shwei-htì’s many 
failings. Ù Kalà establishes the basis for the eventual fall of Tabin-shwei-htì by stressing 
that he had abandoned Burman cultural practices and committed himself fully to Mon 
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cultural practices, such as a Mon manners and dress (Kalà 1932: 2.215). Other references 
are more explicit: the royal ministers were unhappy that Tabin-shwei-htì sent them away 
on campaigns to keep them away so that improper things could be done with their wives 
(Kalà 1932: 2.246). Ù Kalà also points attention to Tabin-shwei-htì’s relationship with a 
certain Portuguese mercenary, with whom he drank alcohol, something unbefitting an 
ideal Buddhist ruler (Kalà 1932: 2.246). The Buddhist monk Shin Sandá-linka also 
inserted into his Maní-yadana-bon, his account of the fifteenth century sayings of Wun-
zin Mìn-yaza, a comment on Tabin-shwei-htì’s un-Buddist abuse of alcohol and his 
mistreatment of his ministers (Sandá-linka 1896: 149). Given the claimed antiquity of the 
sayings, this would have been a highly anachronistic reference, indicating that this 
insertion was meant to make a point. As a result, Tabin-shwei-htì had alienated many of 
his ministers, Mon and Burman alike, and to pre-empt a possible coup, Bayín-naung 
attempted to ameliorate the situation by giving the corrupting mercenary a ship, with gold 
and silver, apparently intended as a bribe, and dispatched him back to India (Kalà 1932: 2 
247). This move came too late: Tabin-shwei-htì had already alienated too many of his 
ministers and was murdered by some members of his court in 1551 (Kalà 1932: 2 250). 
Bayín-naung, however, is portrayed as the man with the real kingly virtues. In 
fact, Tabin-shwei-htì’s reign appears in the chronicles less as accounts of Tabin-shwei-
htì’s activities than as accounts of Bayín-naung’s exploits during the reign of Tabin-
shwei-htì. This suggests that the extreme difference between the figures provided for 
Tabin-shwei-htì’s and Bayín-naung’s campaigns is partly due to his unfavorable image in 
the eyes of Burmese and Mon literati in the late First Taung-ngu court and after. 
Indigenous exaggeration regarding warfare worked from an understanding that a man of 
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hpòn (power derived from his good kharma or superior store of merit), a true king such 
as Bayín-naung, would attract the loyalty of a large number of men. In other words, the 
size of the army of such a king was a reflection of his superior hpòn and thus his 
legitimacy as a ruler. A king of lesser hpòn, such as Tabin-shwei-htì (by comparison to 
Bayín-naung), would command the loyalties of fewer men (For a background to these 
expectations, see Lieberman 1984: 65-78, especially p. 75).  
I have considered the possibility that early modern Burmese literati may have 
reduced Tabin-shwei-htì’s forces in their accounts because he, unlike Bayín-naung, lost 
his campaign against Ayudhya, thus requiring some excuse for his defeat. This is a 
western perspective that does not fit well with early modern Burmese historiography. 
While western accounts, such as those of the early seventeenth century Portuguese at 
Syriam, dramatically underestimate their own forces and exaggerate those of the enemy 
in order to demonstrate personal bravery or divine providence, Burmese literati appear to 
have associated the attraction of men to the royal standard, as mentioned above, as 
indicative of the king’s hpòn. Thus, if Burmese literati sought only to explain the defeat 
of the campaign against Ayudhya, and nothing else, some other device would likely have 
been used to explain defeat (perhaps treachery or the lack of firearms). By stressing the 
low numbers available to Tabin-shwei-htì, they were also stressing his inferior hpòn, just 
as his defeat per se was a reflection of the same. As Lieberman explains, ambitious 
subordinates “could always justify rebellion through Buddhist notions that interpreted 
military defeat as evidence of the High King’s moral failure” (Lieberman 1984: 36). 
Again, as mentioned above, the low numbers attributed to Tabin-shwei-htì’s 
armies during his campaign against Ayudhya served the same purpose in the narrative as 
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Ù Kalà’s references to unhappiness amongst his followers, and other signs of Tabin-
shwei-htì’s lesser prowess and diminished legitimacy. Burman and Mon literati refused to 
embellish Tabin-shwei-htì’s image by attributing to him any more than one-eighth the 
number of men they attributed to Bayín-naung. By commanding fewer manpower 
reserves, indirectly demonstrating a lesser degree of prowess, Tabin-shwei-htì was in 
effect reduced in stature by comparison to the more popular Bayín-naung. This 
interpretation of the numbers would be in full keeping with Ù Kalà’s implied goals in 
composing his text: to put Burmese history into a moral framework (see also the 
discussion in Hla Pe 1985: 54).  
 
THE LATE FIRST TAUNG-NGU EXCEPTION 
 
One might reasonably question this interpretation of the “exaggeration” in the 
chronicles to “rate” the prowess of kings by raising up the example of Nan-dá-bayin. 
Like Bayín-naung, he too commanded massive armies and yet his failures as king far 
surpassed those of Tabin-shwei-htì. He bled Lower Burma literally to death, alienated the 
population and the monks, and suffered the ultimate disgrace, the loss of Pegu and his 
own murder (Lieberman 1984: 41-43). One would expect that chroniclers would have 
been attributed to him as well smaller armies than those of his glorious predecessor. Nan-
dá-bayin, however, presents a complex case. He was the chosen successor of his father 
(Lieberman 1984: 36), unlike Bayín-naung for whom the chronicles make no claim of his 
having been selected by Tabin-shwei-htì. Indeed, in the latter case, being selected by such 
an ignominious king would have cast a shadow of doubt on Bayín-naung himself, 
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something Burmese chroniclers avoided. Thus, the chronicles are silent concerning any 
grant to Bayín-naung by Tabin-shwei-htì: Bayín-naung had to prove his prowess and 
right to rule on his own merits through conquest. Indeed, it took Bayín-naung two years 
to suppress his chief rivals and secure the throne (Lieberman 1984: 36).  
 Instead, Nan-dá-bayin is treated in the chronicles as a rightful heir to a glorious 
king, but one who eventually was negligent and became guilty of azaravapatti, a “failure 
of duty” (Than Tun 1988: 118). By ignoring his responsibilities and as a result of poor 
administration in the later years of his reign, he suffered from instant kharma: his people 
fled to other kingdoms (HNY 1955: 3.99), his son and nominated heir was killed in battle 
(HNY 1955: 3.98; Du Jarric 1919: 73), his kingdom fell apart as outlying vassal lords 
rebelled (HNY 1955: 3.102), and his sister’s husband had him murdered (HNY 1955: 
3.109). Clearly this portrayal reads something like the plot of a major tragedy in full 
keeping with Ù Kalà’s stated goals in composing his text: Ù Kalà sought to show the 
reasons for the rise and fall of kings in the context of moral and immoral rule.  
Thus, Nan-dá-bayin’s armies in the early, good years, of his reign were quoted as 
being very large, though not as large as those of Bayín-naung, but then dwindle as the 
quality of his rule declined. This is indicated by an examination of the numbers of men 
the chronicles claim Nan-dá-bayin could put into the field against his chief enemy 
Ayudhya: in the 1586 campaign against Ayudhya, Nan-dá-bayin’s army consisted of 
1,200 war elephants, 12,000 cavalry, and 352,000 men (Kalà 1961: 3.81); in a 1590 
campaign, Nan-dá-bayin put together two armies, one consisting of 500 war elephants, 
6,000 cavalry, and 100,000 warriors that marched against Mogaung and a second army of 
1,000 war elephants, 12,000 cavalry, and 200,000 warriors that marched against Ayudhya 
 24 
(Kalà 1961: 3.86-87; HNY 1955: 3.93), making a total of 1,500 war elephants, 18,000 
cavalry, and 300,000 warriors; in the 1592 campaign against Ayudhya, for example, Nan-
dá-bayin could only muster an army of 1,500 war elephants, 20,000 cavalry, and 240,000 
warriors (Kalà 1961: 3.90-91; HNY 1955: 3.97); and in the 1594 campaign against 
Mawla-myine (Moulmein), on the route to Ayudhya, his army consisted of a mere 400 
war elephants, 4,000 cavalry, and 80,000 warriors (Kalà 1961: 3.93). This analysis, 
however, obviously does not include limited campaigns against smaller polities unrelated 
to the First Taung-ngu-Ayudhya rivalry. In the 1591 campaign against Mogaung, for 
example, he put together an army of 600 war elephants, 6,000 horse, and 80,000 men 
(Kalà 1961: 3.88; HNY 1955: 3.95). 
Burmese sources on the later years of Nan-dá-bayin’s reign are few, beyond that 
of U Kalà, due in part to the damage to texts in the royal library in 1752, as mentioned 
above. Thus, most later Burmese accounts are dependent upon Ù Kalà’s admittedly 
strategic portrayal of events. We can still arrive at contemporary indigenous perspectives 
through some of the European accounts. We do have European sources that provide 
figures for the size of Nan-dá-bayin’s armies and these sources indicate a drop in the size 
of those armies from the early to later years of his reign. The largest army first sent 
against Ayudhya by Nan-dá-bayin, for example, was quoted by Du Jarric’s sources as 
numbering 900,000 men; for 1595, as numbering only 150,000 men; and for 1596/7, he is 
said to have commanded a population, not an army, of only 30,000 “ men, women, and 
children” (Du Jarric 1919: 73, 76, 78). As I will explain in the following section, 
European sources though used to confirm indigenous accounts, frequently repeat the 
same (oral) sources upon which the Burmese texts are based and thus I suggest that such 
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European figures may reflect contemporary indigenous perspectives on Nan-dá-bayin’s 
reign. This cannot yet be demonstrated with complete certainty, as, again, contemporary 
indigenous sources for the reign of Nan-dá-bayin, unlike those for his father, are 
extremely limited. 
My contention is that we should not reject these numbers on the basis of their 
exaggeration, but view them as one way that early modern Burmese literati chose to 
reflect their impressions of very real developments during Nan-dá-bayin’s reign and 
those of his predecessors in the First Taung-ngu Dynasty. I should stress that I am not 
suggesting that the declining figures for Nan-dá-bayin’s military muster are solely a 
literati creation. My argument is actually the reverse. The statistics themselves are not 
based on precise accounting. Instead, they reflect real developments and real impressions 
from contemporary sources and it is the relationship between the statistics provided in the 
chronicles, such as when one king is said to have had a million men and another a 
hundred thousand men, that must draw our attention. Indeed, there was a very real 
decline in Nan-dá-bayin’s military manpower base (Lieberman 1985: 41), but the 
statistics offered in the chronicles only intended to reflect this trend in declining sets of 
exaggerated numbers, not to provide a precise accounting of the actual numbers of men 
available at different points of time. 
As I have mentioned, these contemporary literati were probably aware of the 
difference between real numbers of troops involved and those they claimed and thus, the 
degree of exaggeration or under exaggeration served as a kind of index for their favor or 
disfavor of the reigning king. Later literati, writing on the basis of these accounts, carried 
these numbers into their own compilations. In other words, Harvey’s negative assessment 
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of these figures as later and falsely enumerated data on royal armies is a misreading of 
the origin and purpose of this kind of exaggeration. This is not completely Harvey’s fault. 
He wrote his history in the context of the colonial period in which indigenous source 
accounts tended to be treated with contempt by European historians. As a result, 
however, Harvey misunderstood and rejected as fanciful what is in reality valuable 
subjective data. 
 
USING NUMERICAL DATA FROM THE CHRONICLES 
 
 Thus far, I have attempted to demonstrate that hyperbolic quantified data should 
not be rejected out of hand as unreliable. Instead, I have argued that such data actually 
yields valuable subjective data not despite being exaggerated, but because such data  is 
exaggerated (to different degrees). This does not mean, however, that we cannot use 
some numbers provided in the indigenous texts as objective data. Instead, each set of 
numerical data has to be approached on its own merits and interrogated in its own 
context. Several problems must be taken into consideration first if such interrogation is to 
be successful. 
 First, historians frequently establish the veracity of a stated figure in the 
indigenous sources by comparing it to contemporary European accounts and similar or 
dissimilar stated figures. This approach has some hazards, as it bifurcates into two 
separate and mutually unintelligible groups those who were frequently in intimate 
communication concerning the events, the people, and the quantities involved in the 
events in which they all participated. A good example is that of Portuguese and Burmese 
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accounts, themselves or their main sources being first-hand accounts of the events they 
describe. We know that in the 1630s western Burmese court at Mrauk-U, for example, 
Portuguese freebooters as far away as Chittagong were intimately aware of private royal 
information through Christian Japanese who served in the royal bodyguard and some of 
whose indigenous wives were servants of the court queens and noble ladies (Manrique 
1946: 1.173-4). Father Manrique, the Portuguese priest who lived in Mrauk-U in the 
1630s conveyed an impressive awareness of sixteenth-century First Taung-ngu dynastic 
history, which he gained by conversing with indigenous learned men and by learning to 
read for himself western Burmese texts and Lower Burmese texts captured from Pegu in 
1599 (Manrique 1946: 1.241-2).  
The results of this kind of familiarity with indigenous interpretations of events 
(and numbers) has made their verification using European sources problematic. Probably 
the most significant problem, is that we occasionally find the same suspicious statistical 
data sets moving around through indigenous and Portuguese sources, but being used to 
demonstrate different things in different places, and at different times. The best example 
is that of the three thousand cannon taken at Pegu in 1599. Both western Burmese and the 
Portuguese sources agree on the number of cannon involved. According to the early 
seventeenth century account of Du Jarric, who based his account entirely on letters sent 
to Europe by Portuguese witnesses to this campaign, Pegu had exactly three thousand 
cannon prior to its fall to western Burmese and Taung-ngu armies (Du Jarric 1919: 76). 
According to Maha-zei-yá-theinka, however, who was almost certainly personally 
involved in the 1598/99 campaign, western Burmese forces had captured the younger 
brother of the Ayudhyan king Naresuan when he came through Pegu to take some of the 
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spoils from the fallen capital after the siege. He was held for ransom, and, in exchange, 
Naresuan provided three thousand cannon (evidently on the spot) as well as a number of 
bronze images (Maha-zei-yá-theinka 1608: 20b). At first sight, a comparison of the 
Portuguese and western Burmese accounts may seem to confirm the reference to three 
thousand cannon. A more thorough interrogation of the reference, however, reveals a 
high probability that the figure was derived in both accounts from the same indigenous 
source(s). It may also be important that there are no other references to anyone having 
seen these cannon at any later time. The number itself becomes more suspicious when we 
compare it to other enumerated data provided for the booty from the campaign in 
indigenous sources: three hundred Pegu court women, three thousand cannon, three 
thousand Thai families, and thirty thousand Mon families, all taken back to western 
Burma (Maha-zei-yá-theinka 1608: 20b-21a).  
Second, both the indigenous and the Portuguese accounts tended to exaggerate 
their figures for different reasons, but ultimately lead to comparable hyperbole. As I have 
explained above, indigenous exaggeration in the kinds of accounts discussed in this 
article worked from an understanding that a man of prowess, a true king such as Bayín-
naung, would attract the loyalty of a large number of men. In other words, the size of the 
army of such a king was a reflection of his superior hpòn and his legitimacy as king. A 
lesser king, such as Tabin-shwei-htì (by comparison to Bayín-naung), would command 
the loyalties of fewer men. Again, as discussed above, the low numbers attributed to his 
armies during his campaign against Ayudhya served the same purpose in the narrative as 
Ù Kalà’s references to unhappiness amongst his followers, and other signs of Tabin-
shwei-htì’s lesser hpòn and diminished legitimacy (Kalà 1932: 2.246-7, 250). Thus, 
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whether a campaign was won or lost, a great king such as Bayín-naung would have an 
extremely large army.  
Portuguese perspectives on such matters were very different. Earthly events being 
a reflection of divine providence, success in warfare could be achieved by a small 
number of men favored by God. The lesser the number of men in the face of an even 
innumerable host, the greater the role that divine intervention played in bringing victory. 
For this reason, Salvador Ribeyro, in his account of his stand with a few dozen 
Portuguese against much larger western Burmese forces at Syriam (1601-1603), makes 
only infrequent reference to the thousands of Mon warriors upon whom his victories 
depended (BDCCRP 1936). In the Portuguese accounts of Philip de Brito, consistent 
attempts are made to explain his immorality and that of his supporters prior to the fall of 
his fortress at Syriam in 1613 (Faria y Sousa 1630: 3.191-194). On the other hand, 
references to the high numbers of men attributed to indigenous armies were made in the 
context of their earthly wealth, a frequent theme in Portuguese accounts of Burma. Large 
Burmese armies, for the Portuguese, were not the result of moral virtue (indeed, many 
Portuguese accounts argued a lack of moral virtue in Burma) and the favor of God, but 
instead reflected their wealth and the resources of the kingdom, very attractive to booty-
minded freebooters. Portuguese witnesses, then, had a different reason for accepting high 
figures for indigenous armies, numbers they likely did not have the ability (or motive) to 
challenge any degree of certainty.  Further, they had motive to embellish these numbers 
even more than the Burmese accounts. The European sources upon whom Du Jarric 
based his account, for example, state that Bayín-naung’s invasion army sent against 
Ayudhya, numbered 1, 600, 000. This is significant, as it does not appear to be a 
 30 
randomly selected number, but instead an exact doubling of the indigenous figures 
circulated in Bayín-naung’s time (Du Jarric 1919: 70). This might possibly explain the 
fact that the quantities of men in First Taung-ngu armies as exaggerated in the indigenous 
sources, and all being contemporary exaggerations as I have discussed above, were 
equally exaggerated by the European accounts. The European sources claim, for example, 
that Nan-dá-bayin mustered an army of 900,000 men for his attack on Ayudhya (Du 
Jarric 1919: 73). 
In short, European (at least Portuguese) sources from the period are problematic 
because they lend themselves to confirmation of indigenous data while having very little 
reliable basis to do so. Portuguese and Burmese perspectives on warfare were very 
different, but in their own way arrived at very similar results when it came to estimating 
the numbers of men involved in early modern Burmese warfare. This is thus another 
reason to look for other ways to interpret such numerical data. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Any analysis of early modern Burmese texts as reliable sources for data on 
indigenous warfare must begin with an understanding of who composed these texts and 
identify their purposes in including military statistics (and enumerated data generally) in 
their narratives. I have taken into consideration the experiences of early modern Burmese 
literati with warfare and examined their writings in this context. Using the examples of 
the 1598/99 western Burmese campaign against Pegu, Tabin-shwei-htì’s campaign 
against Ayudhya in 1548, Bayín-naung’s campaign against the same in 1565, and the 
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complicated case of Nan-dá-bayin, I have attempted to identify the ways in which these 
statistics were meant to be understood.  
My argument is that rather than attempting to provide consistent hard statistics of 
the men involved in early modern Burmese military campaigns, early modern Burmese 
literati, living at the same time and sometimes engaging in the campaigns described, 
manipulated such “hard” numbers to convey subjective data on the political world around 
them. In doing so, they would likely have been keenly aware of the inconsistency 
between the manipulated figures, the “soft” figures, and the actual numbers, the “hard” 
figures, of men fighting in the field. For several reasons, however, they chose to 
exaggerate or understate a given number at certain places in their narrative. I also 
attempted to identify some of this subjective data. Finally, I examined the problems 
involved in using early European sources in attempting to confirm the statistics found in 
the indigenous texts.  
I do not suggest that previous studies that have used statistics from the chronicles 
are necessarily less strong as a result of my argument. Indeed, in many cases, they will be 
strengthened in additional, though perhaps unintended ways. While it is true that many of 
the statistics offered in the Burmese chronicles are not based upon objective enumeration, 
they do reflect contemporary subjective perspectives of the rulers the numbers are 
contrived to support or to denigrate. These subjective perspectives were in turn a 
reflection, in turn, of the objective power of the subject, his victories, his successes, and 
so on. Thus, to take one example I have used in this article, Bayín-naung may not have 
commanded eight times as many men (though he probably did have more) as Tabin-
shwei-htì, but we do know by other registers that he was a more successful ruler, his 
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court was more stable, and his victories in war more significant. These basic facts helped 
to influence the perspectives of the moral strength (or weakness) of these two rulers. 
Hence, Tabin-shwei-htì’s lesser number of troops and the greater number of Bayín-
naung’s were rendered in the sources as a reflection of their hpòn or moral strength 
(subjective), which in turn indirectly reflected their victories, strengths, and the overall 
stability of their realms (objective).  
To sum up, the numbers of warriors, cavalry, and war elephants in the early 
modern texts we use as primary sources should not be automatically rejected on the basis 
of exaggeration. Rather, we need to grapple with such material in order to fully 
understand what the early modern Burmese literati were trying to tell us, and tell others, 
during their own time. 
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